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Abstract 
This study contributes to the literature by estimating Interest Rate Pass Through (IRPT) using Pakistani 
aggregate banks’ lending and deposit rate data. Lending and deposit rates are estimated to be sluggish in 
terms of their response to a change in monetary policy rate.  There is also evidence of asymmetry in the 
pass through of four types of banks (i.e., privatized, nationalized, foreign and specialized).  Overall, the 
domestic banks’ pass through is estimated to be higher than that of foreign bank. Although the IRPT is 
estimated to be incomplete, the degree of lending rate pass- through is not very low. This study provides 
evidence of an increase in the adjustment speed when the lending rate is below equilibrium after January 
2005. However, there was no significant change in the pass through after January 2005 which coincided 
with the constant increase in the Treasury bill rate by the State Bank of Pakistan. 
Keywords: 
1. Introduction: 
Interest rate is one of many tools of monetary policy. The Interest Rate Pass-Through (IRPT) is defined as 
the transmission of policy rate to lending and deposit rates in the economy. The pass through is complete 
only if an immediate transmittal of policy rate change to lending and deposit rates exists.  Thus, estimation 
of IRPT duration is very important. A complete IRPT implies that monetary policy is very effective and 
that the central bank can influence macroeconomic variables. 
This study utilizes Pakistani data on weighted average lending and deposit rates from 2001 – 2009 from 
four types of banks (i.e., private domestic, foreign, nationalized and specialized) in order to compute IRPT. 
This study contributes to the literature by estimating IRPT with respect to bank type.  Gross loans and 
deposits are used as a weight to measure weighted average loans and deposit rates. Qayyum and Sajawal 
(2005) utilized weighted averge of outstanding loans and deposits in their study.. However, new loan and 
deposit contracts are excluded in this type of weighting scheme. New contracts are important for banks and 
their adjustment is more likely than outstanding loans and deposits. Their results may have a bias. On the 
contrary, our study uses data sets which include new contracts of loans and deposits in the weighting 
scheme 
The estimates from this type of data set may provide more robust results. Since banks tend to change the 
lending rates on new contracts more frequently than outstanding ones.  
2.1 Literature Review: 
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There is no consensus regarding a complete pass through in the literature.  The literature can be grouped 
into three major categories. In the first group,studies reported a complete pass through process with respect 
to an official monetary policy instrument (Kagan, 2009; Liu et al., 2008; Bondt, 2002, 2005; Graeve and 
Vennet, 2004; Hoffman and Mizen, 2004; Paula, 2009; Crespo and Thomas, 2006; Sorensen and 
Werner,2006). In the second group, studies reported incomplete IRPTs. However, the degree of stickiness 
was different across banks and banking products (Aydin, 2007; Qayyum and Sajawal, 2005; Rebucci and 
Espinosa, 2003; Leuven and Leuven, 2001; Cottarelli et al., 1995). In the third group, studies attempted to 
find reasons for IRPT stickiness. For example, Weth (2002) reported institution size as a factor in IRPT 
stickiness.  Cottarelli et al. (1995) showed that IRPT stickiness was due to constraints on competition and 
financial markets. This study also reported that the degree of stickiness decreased after liberalization. 
Rebucci and Espinosa-Vega (2003) considered market power as the primary reason for incomplete pass 
throughs in Chile. Leuvensteijn et al. (2008) used bank data from1994 - 2004 to examine the positive 
relationship between competition and IRPT. This study provided evidence that competition pressure is 
more likely to exist in the loan rather than the deposit market.  Graeve et al. (2004) cited measurement and 
aggregation errors in retail rates data as a major factor with regard to rigid consumer loan and savings 
deposit rates.  
3.  Methodology:  
Panel data techniques will be utilized in this study. Panel Unit Root tests will first be applied to assess for 
stationary data. Pedroni Panel Cointegration tests will then be applied to assess the long run relationship 
between Treasury Bill (TB), lending and deposit rates. Finally, the Phillips and Loretan method (1991) will 
be applied with cross section dummy variables.. The Error Correction model will be estimated to capture 
short run dynamics. 
3.1 Panel Unit Root Tests 
This study will utilize three panel unit root tests to assess stationary data of lending, deposit and TB rates 
(Levin et al., 2002; Im et al., 2003; Hadri, 2000). 
The Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) test assumes that persistence parameters remain the same across cross 
sections. This means that ψi=ψ for all i. Alternatively, the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) test allows ψ to vary 
across all cross sections. 
The LLC model allows for fixed effects and unit specific time trend along with common time effects. The 
structure of their model is shown below: 
,1, ittiitiiit yty    i=1,2…N,t=1,2…T                                                    
(1) 
The unit specific fixed effect is important to capture heterogeneity since the coefficient of the lagged 
dependant variable is homogeneous across all cross sections in equation 1. The LLC tested the null 
hypothesis: 0:0 iH  for all i against the alternative 0:  iAH  for all i. The LLC test 
assumes that errors are independent across all cross sections.
1
 Im et al. (2003) extended the LLC 
framework by allowing heterogeneity in ρiunder the alternative hypothesis.  The Lagrange Multiplier tests 
of Hadri (2000) has a different null hypothesis than other panel unit root tests. It posits that all unit roots are 
stationary, which is opposite to LLC and IPS.  This is similar to univariate KPSS tests, and the test 
statistic is distributed standard normal under the null hypothesis. In our case, the comparison of the results 
from all three types of tests will be an interesting estimation. 
3.2 Panel Cointegration: 
 This study attempts to use the Pedroni (1999, 2004) panel cointegration test to estimate a long run 
relationship between bank and TB rates. Pedroni derived nearly seven tests which are within- and 
between-dimensions. In order to calculate within- dimension statistics, the numerator and denominator are 
summed up by N separate cross section regressions. The between-dimensions statistics are derived by 
                                                 
1
 For more technical details see Banerjee Anindya (1999) 
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dividing the numerator and denominator before summing N cross sections.  Pedroni’s tests are residual 
based, similar to the Engle Granger tests. The slope coefficients vary over cross section units, thereby 
allowing heterogeneity within the model.  The following panel equation is estimated: 
                                                           
(2) 
whereas, i =1, 2………N cross sectional units, t=1, 2………..T time periods, and represents the column 
vector which consists of M independent variables for each ith unit. M represents the number of independent 
variables. Similarly,  represents the column vector for each cross section i. The variables Y and X are 
considered to be non stationary, I (1) integrated of order one. The residual   will be non stationary, 
I(1), under the hypothesis of no cointegration. The parameters   tend to capture cross 
sectional fixed effects and deterministic trends, respectively. The separate slope coefficients ensure that 
cointegrating vectors may also be heterogeneous.  
In order to compute the required panel cointegrating statistic, Equation 1 is estimated by OLS, for every 
individual cross section. The within-dimension based estimates are panel  and panel t statistics.  They 
are derived by computing the first difference of all variables.  
                       (3) 
 
3.3 Phillips and Loretain (PL, 1991) Method 
The marginal cost pricing model can be explained by the following equation
2
 
                                                         (4) 
i=1,2,…..,N and t=1,2………T  
Where  represents bank lending or deposit rate;  , the monetary policy instrument, TB rate, money 
market rate or federal fund rate; , the residual term;  and  measure the mark up and long run 
degree of pass through respectively.  
Liu et al. (2008) estimated the following triangular system of equations to model long run relationship 
between policy rate and market rates; 
,        t=1, 2,……, T                                   (5) 
Xit =Xit-1+U2it                                                                                                                    
(5a) 
Where  is a stationary vector. 
The estimation of equation 1 requires both interest rates to be non stationary. If the   is not stationary 
then U2it interest rates will not cointegrate, thereby, resulting in a spurious estimate.  
Liu et al. reveals that even if U1it is stationary, OLS estimates of equations 1 and 1a do not have standard 
distribution when U1it and U2it are correlated.  Phillips and Loretan (1991) suggested inclusion of leads and 
lags of the first difference in Xt, . They estimated the following equation: 
+        (6) 
The parameter estimates are unbiased asymptotically and normally distributed. Use of this model provides 
two additional advantages. First, this model considers structural changes, if they should occur. Second, it 
addresses past policy surprises and future policy settings with regard to policy instrument and bank rates.  
3.4 Short term dynamics: 
A structural error correction model is used to measure short term dynamics. It is suitable to measure the 
contemporaneous effect of changes in policy rates on bank rates (e.g., deposit and lending rates). 
                                                 
2
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This study utilizes the following error correction (ECM) framework based on the general ADL (p,q) model: 
     (7)  
Where  represents the first difference operator; represents bank 
rates (e.g., deposit and lending rates) disequilibrium at time with one lag.  The  measures impact 
passes through rate; and  are dynamic adjustment coefficients and  captures error correction 
adjustment speed when the rates are away from equilibrium. The sign of  is negative because interest 
rates are mean reverting.  
The mean adjustment lag can be calculated for the ADL (1, 1) model with the following formula: 
                                                                                             
(8) 
which measures complete pass through from policy rate (e.g.,TB or money market rate) to bank rate (e.g., 
deposit and lending rate). For general ADL (p,q), the MAL can be calculated as a weighted average of all 
lags. This measures the speed in which bank rates are adjusted towards a change in policy rate.  
Asymmetry (i.e., different adjustment speeds) occurs when rates are above and below the equilibrium. To 
test its existence in the bank rates (deposit and lending) a dummy variable (  ) will be added to equation 2, 
which is 1 if residual lag, , is positive and 0 otherwise.  The following equation captures asymmetric 
adjustments: 
+            
(9) 
where 1-λ measures error correction adjustment speed when rates are above the equilibrium and , when 
rates are below the equilibrium. Furthermore, the Wald test can be used to assess if  is significantly 
different from .  
Therefore, two mean adjustment lags (MAL), above and below equilibrium, can be calculated using the 
following formula: 
10 
where MAL
+
 represents bank rates above equilibrium. 
= (                                                                                                       
(11) 
where MAL
-
 represents bank rates below equilibrium. The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) began increasing 
the TB rate after January 2005. Thus, it is useful to estimate the change in slope after January 2005. It is 
also important to estimate speed of adjustment after 2005. In order to capture these effects, a modified 
version of equation 6 has been estimated: 
+
                                           
(12) 
 
4.  Results 
4.1 Panel Unit Root Tests 
Table 1 provides the summary of Panel Unit Root tests applied to assess stationary data of lending, deposit 
and TB rates. In most of the cases, computed probabilities were not significant (p< 0.05) for unit roots at 
each level. However, unit root at first difference was significant in most of the cases, thereby implying that 
the variables are non stationary at levels but stationary at first difference, hence integrated of order one. 
This occurs only with the TB rate, which is stationary at second difference according to the Hadri test. 
However, the LLC and IPS tests show that the TB rate is stationary at first difference. Since two tests show 
TB rate as I (1), it is considered to be  stationary at first difference.  
4.2 Pedroni (1999, 2004) Panel Cointegration Tests 
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The residual based Pedroni’s panel cointegration test between lending and TB rates are summarized in 
Table 2. In the within-dimension test, seven of eight tests showed cointegration (p< 0.05). Similarly, the 
two of three between-dimension tests showed cointegration. The group ADF stat has a p value of 0.06. 
Overall, there is ample evidence of a long run relationship between lending and TB rates.  
Table 3 shows Pedroni’s residual based panel cointegration tests for deposit and TB rates. In eight 
within-dimension tests, the computed probabilities are estimated to be very high. However, there was no 
significant evidence of cointegration in all cases. Hence, there is no evidence of a long run relationship 
between deposit and TB rates according to within-dimension tests. Similarly, in three between-dimension 
tests, the computed probabilities showed no significant cointegration for deposit and TB rates. Kok and 
Thomas (2006) reported similar results for saving deposits in the Euro area using the Pedroni residual 
based test. This study suggested that the adjustment in saving deposit is so sluggish that there is no 
cointegration with the market rate.  
4.3 PL (1991) estimates with slopes and intercepts dummies:  
Table 4showsthree types of estimated equations for both lending rates. Equation 1 allows three slopes and 
intercept dummies with overall slope and intercept. In Equation 1, the slope and intercept dummy of 
specialized banks is omitted to avoid the dummy variable trap. Equation 2 includes the slope and intercept 
dummy of specialized banks but omits nationalized banks. Equation 3 has all the slopes and intercept 
dummies and excludes overall slope and intercept.  
Equation 1 for lending rate estimates the overall slope to be 0.22, which is not close to one. The slope 
dummies of nationalized, foreign and private banks are significant with a positive coefficient. The slope 
dummies of nationalized, privatized and foreign banks are 0.5, 0.42 and 0.33, respectively.  I estimated 
that these slope dummies are equal using the Wald coefficient restriction test. The F test value of this test 
implies that these slopes are indeed equal. The results imply that nationalized banks have the highest IRPT, 
followed by private and foreign banks. The IRPT of the weighted average lending rate is not complete, but 
is moderate since the slope dummies of three types of banks are greater than 0.5. This implies heterogeneity 
in the response of weighted average lending rate changes when the TB rate is changed as a tool to 
implement monetary policy. A time dummy was also added (i.e., 0 before January 2005 and 1 after that). 
This dummy variable represents the time when SBP began to raise TB rates in response to higher 
inflationary pressure. I combined this dummy variable with the first difference of TB to capture the slope 
effects after January 2005 and each equation showed no significant differences (data not shown).  
In equation 2, dummies were switched by adding slope and intercept dummies of specialized banks and 
skipping the dummies of nationalized banks. The overall slope is 0.70 and the slope dummy of specialized 
banks (i.e.,TB-SB) is -0.50. However, the slopes of private and foreign banks are estimated to be 
insignificant.  In equation 3, all dummies were utilized; however, overall slope and intercept were 
excluded. The IRPT of nationalized, private, foreign and specialized banks are 0.72, 0.70, 0.60 and 0.3, 
respectively. All intercepts are negative and significant. However, the slope dummy after January 2005 is 
insignificant.  
4.5 Impulse Response of Deposit to TB rate   
Table 5 illustrates the impulse response of DDEP, first difference of deposit rate to one standard deviation 
shock in DTB and first difference of TB rate. Since DDEP and TB have no cointegration, the VAR model 
was estimated in first difference form. The graph shows that innovations to DTB have a positive impact on 
DDEP since it does not go below zero.  Since ordering of the variables is important, variables were used 
in this order: DTB, DDEP. This graph shows both upward and downward trends, however, overall results 
remain positive. A peak is reached in the sixth month and touches the zero line in the 13th, 18th, 20th and 
22nd months. It is nearly extinct after 13 months. 
4.6 Evidence of Asymmetric Adjustment in short run:          
  
This study estimates the asymmetric short run 
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speed of adjustment (Table 6), similar to Liu M.H et al (2008). The λ represents the parameter below the 
equilibrium 
 when the estimated residual, ECL is negative. The parameter (1-λ) captures the effect when  
ECL is positive. Table 10 shows that both parameters are insignificant. Table 10 shows that λ1 is 
significant at 5%. The parameter λ1 
 captures the speed of adjustment when the lending rate is below equilibrium after the January 2005 period.  
The (1-λ1) parameter is insignificant due to its low t and high p values. Thus, both parameters are equal.  
The speed of adjustment after January 2005 increased when the lending rate is estimated to be below  
the equilibrium level.  
5. Conclusion 
This study provides estimates of IRPTs using Pakistani aggregate banks’ deposit and lending rates.Results 
showed that deposit, lending and TB rates are non stationary at levels in the aggregate bank type data. 
Cointegration test revealeda long run relationship between lending and TB rates,however, deposit and TB 
rates were not cointegrated.  Estimation of the first difference VAR model for deposit and TB rate showed 
that the TB parameter was significant at the 1st, 2nd and 4th lag. The highest short run IRPT was estimated 
to be 0.12, which is very low. This result is consistent with other studies in the literature. Banks probably 
tend to adjust deposit rates very slowly. The SBP strategy paper mentions the fact that most deposits 
remained negative in real terms whereas the banks’ margins remained high. 
The PL (1991) estimates of aggregate lending rates reveal that the pass through of three types of banks is 
moderately more than 0.5 but less than one even in the long run. The highest lending rate IRPT was for 
nationalized banks, followed by privatized, foreignand specialized banks. The Wald test estimates revealed 
significant differences in IRPTs of all bank types. Thus, the monetary policy affects lending rate more than 
deposit rates in Pakistan, even for years to come.  
There is evidence of heterogeneity among four types of banks.  Furthermore, a shift in IRPT after January 
2005 was not evident. Estimates of short run asymmetric adjustments in the lending rate showed no 
evidence of change in the speed of adjustment whether the lending rates were below or above the 
equilibrium for the overall period. However, evidence proved that the banks’ speed of adjustment increased 
after January 2005 when lending rates were below the equilibrium. 
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Table 1: Panel Unit Root Test 
Method   Null Hypothesis 
               
Lend   
               
Deposit   
        
TBill   
            
    Stat Pro Stat Pro Stat Pro
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b. b. b. 
LLC- t* 
Stat 
Leve
l 
Unit Root 
(common process) -1.57 
0.0
57 -1.00 
0.1
5 -1.05 
0.1
4 
  
1st 
Diff  -20.43 
0.0
0* -6.41 
0.0
0* -3.88 
0.0
0* 
            
Hadri-Z
* stat 
Leve
l  Stationarity 7.34 
0.0
0 9.7 
0.0
0 4.9 
0.0
0 
  
1ST 
Diff  -1.24 
0.1
0* 0.82 
0.2
1* 0.09 
0.0
0* 
            
IPS-W 
Stat level 
Unit  Root 
(individual process) 0.37 
0.6
4 2.05 
0.9
8 0.65 
0.7
4 
  
1st 
Diff  -21.32 
0.0
0* -7.11 
0.0
0* -6.03 
0.0
0* 
            
Hadri Z  level Stationarity  7.39 
0.0
0 9.5 
0.0
0 4.9 0.0 
  
1st 
Diff  1.45 
0.0
7* 0.87 
0.2
0* 0.09# 
0.0
0* 
        
 
 
         
Lend is weighted average lending rate, weighted average Deposit is deposit rate and TB is Treasury Bill 
rate 
 
Table 2: Pedroni Residual based Panel Cointegration Test 
 
Variables: Lending rate and TB rate. 
Ho: No Cointegration 
     
Ha: with-in-dimension Statistic Prob 
Weighted 
Stat 
Prob 
Panel V Stat 1.63 0.05** 1.37 0.08*** 
       
Panel rho-Stat -3.39 0.0003* -3.05 0.001* 
       
Panel PP-Stat -2.71 0.003* -2.49 0.006* 
       
Panel ADF-Stat -2.06 0.01* -2 0.02* 
       
Ha: Between Dimension      
       
Group rho-Stat -2.21 0.01*    
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Group PP-Stat -2.22 0.01*    
       
Group ADF-Stat -1.5 0.06***     
Note: *, ** and *** are significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
 
 
Table 3: Pedroni Residual Based Panel Cointegration Test 
Variables: Deposit and TB rate 
Ho: No Cointegration 
     
Ha: with-in-dimension Statistic Prob. 
Weighted 
Stat 
Prob. 
Panel V Stat -0.86 0.81 -0.56 0.71 
      
Panel rho-Stat 0.32 0.63 0.75 0.77 
      
Panel PP-Stat -1.07 0.14 0.40 0.66 
       
Panel ADF-Stat -1.09 0.14 0.31 0.62 
       
Ha: Between Dimension      
       
Group rho-Stat 1.82 0.97    
       
Group PP-Stat 1.39 0.92    
       
Group ADF-Stat 1.30 0.90     
Note: None of computed probabilities less than 0.10, not significant. 
 
Table 4: PL (1991) Estimates with dummy variables 
  
                    
Lending     
 
 Eq-1  Eq-2  Eq-3           
      
Cons. 5.5  4.3   
      
 [3.9]*  [2.8]*   
      
10 
 
TB 
(PL) 0.22  0.70   
      
 [2.4]*  [3.7]*   
      
TB-FB 0.33  -0.14  0.60 
      
 [1.8]***  [-0.9]  [3.5]* 
      
TB-NB 0.50    0.72 
      
 [2.7]*    [3.9]* 
      
TB-PB 0.42  -0.05  0.70 
      
 [4.6]*  [-0.4]  [7.4]* 
      
TB-SB   -0.50  0.30 
      
   [-2.3]*  [2.7]* 
      
DTB -0.02  -0.02  -0.02 
      
 [-0.2]  [-0.2]  [-0.3] 
      
DERL 0.5  0.50  0.50 
      
 [18.4]*  [18.8]*  [18.4]* 
      
C1-FB -0.8  0.4  -1.5 
      
 [-1.7]***  [-0.9]  [-3.4] 
      
C2-PB -1.09  0.11  -1.7 
      
 [-4.7]  [0.3]  [-7.4]* 
      
C3-NB -1.3    
-1.9  
[-1.9]* 
      
C4-SB 
[-2.7]* 
 
  
1.2 
[2.5]*  
-0.7 
[-2.8]* 
      
   
 
  [-2.8]* 
      
R-Sq 0.98  0.98  0.97 
      
DW 1.81  1.81  1.75 
      
            
TB-FB=slope dummy for foreign banks, TB-DNB=slope dummy for domestic Nationalized banks,  
TB-DPB=slope dummy for domestic privatized banks 
TB-DSB=slope dummy for domestic specialized banks. C1-C4, Intercepts dummies for 4 cross section 
banks. DERL and DERD are first difference of residual from EG-OLS equation for lending and deposit 
rates.  
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DERL and DERD are first difference of residual from EG-OLS equation for lending and deposit. 
Note: Equations include AR (1) and AR (2) terms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure5: Impulse Response DDEP to DTB 
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Note: DTB=TB-TB(-1), First difference of TB rate 
DDEP=DEP-DEP(-1), First difference of deposit rate 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Short Run IRPT and asymmetric speed of adjustment  
 
DLEND = -0.09 + 0.40*DTB –0.04*(λ)–0.01*(1-λ) -0.13*DLEND (-1) 
              (-1.2)    (2.5)**      (-0.96)           (-0.3)             (-2.1) **    
 
               + 0.14*DTB(-1) - 0.21*DTBMP  -0.11*λ1  -0.08*(1-λ1) 
                ( 1.4)                (-0.7)                   (-1.99)**    (-0.6) 
 
        R-Sq=0.33     F-Stat-2.1  Wald-F (C8=C9)=2.41 Prob=0.09   
 
Note: DECL= dummy variable DECL=1 when ECL <0. DECLL=1-DECL  
whereas ECL is residual saved from lending and TB equation. *,**,***implies  
significant at 1,  5 and 10 %. Respectively.DMP is time dummy =1 after January  
2005 and 0 otherwise. DTB=DMP*TB, slope time dummy. DTBMP=DTB*DMP  
slope dummy interacted with time. λ=DECL*ECL(-1), λ1=DECL*DMP*ECL(-1),  
1-λ1=(1-DECL)*DMP*ECL(-1)  
 
 
  
 
